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Abstract
Recent oil price shocks have relatively small effects on real economic activity
andinflationcomparedtotheexperiencesoftheseventiesandtheearlyeight-
ies. In this paper we analyse possible reasons for these phenomena using the
example of the German economy. At first, by estimating a VAR-model and
calculating impulse responses to an oil price shock it is confirmed that the
macroeconomic effects have become much smaller. Moreover, our simula-
tions show that oil price hikes are more closely related to global economic ac-
tivitysincetheearlynineties.Then,togetadeeperunderstandingofthestruc-
tural changes which are responsible for these results we utilize a new Keynes-
ian open economy model.It becomes obvious that the small effects of the re-
cent oil price shocks on the German economy can be explained by a combina-
tion of a reduced energy cost share and good luck in terms of a strong growing
global economy. Hence, if global economic growth decreases, pure oil price
shocks may still have substantial effects on the German economy, even if the
energy pricevulnerability has been reduced.These results should be valid also
for other oil importing countries,at least from a qualitative point of view.
JEL Classification:E31,E32,F41
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Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small? 
1. Introduction 
The popular oil price hikes in the 1970s and 1980s were accompanied by 
economic recessions and higher inflation in most industrialized countries. In 
consequence, movements of crude oil prices are assumed to be an important 
explanation for business cycle fluctuations. The recent oil price rise, how-
ever, seems to be different: nominal oil prices have increased by over 100 
percent since 2002, but world economic activity still grows vigorously and 
inflation  has  not  increased  substantially  so  far.  This  raises  the  question 
whether the relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic activity has 
changed; and if this is the case what has changed? 
Several explanations for a reduced importance of oil price movements are at 
hand: First, the sources of oil price shocks may have changed and the origins 
of the shocks are crucial for the effects on economic growth and inflation. 
Second,  the  energy  intensity  of  the  production  sectors  in  the  developed 
economies has reduced compared to the oil price shocks of the seventies. 
Third, the reactions of economic agents have changed. It is argued that la-
bor unions have not tried to hold real wages constant during the latest oil 
price hike. Related to this, monetary policy was not forced to raise interest 
rates so strongly.  
According  to  which  explanation  dominates,  different  consequences  for 
business cycle fluctuations arise. If the small effects are caused by changes in 
the economic structure, movements of oil prices are no longer a crucial rea-
son for business cycles. If the recent oil price shock, however, is caused by 
increasing  world  demand  and  therefore  different  from  the  seventies  and 
early  eighties,  pure  supply  side-driven  movements  of  oil  prices  may  still 
have pronounced negative effects on economic activity. This is also true for 
the third explanation but in this case the effects of oil price shocks are as-
sessable by economic agents. 
In this paper we analyze the relevance of possible explanations using the 
example of the German economy. Possible changes over time are captured 
by  dividing  the  sample  into  two  sub-periods.  The  first  sub-period  ranges 
from 1975:1 to 1990:4 and the second sub-period lasts from 1991:1 to 2006:4.  
At first, unrestricted VAR-models which contain the real oil price, a meas-
ure of global economic activity and important domestic real and nominal 
variables  are  estimated  separately  for  the  two  sub-periods.  The  relevant Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  5 
effects are visualized by impulse response functions. Since the results sug-
gest, that the interaction between oil prices and global economic activity 
plays a crucial role an oil price hike as well as a world demand shock are 
simulated. 
Then, to get a more sophisticated understanding of the effects of possible 
structural changes, we calculate standard deviations (Kim, Loungani 1991) 
and impulse responses (Rotemberg, Woodford 1996) of a new Keynesian 
open economy model (NOE-model) (McCallum, Nelson 1998, 1999, 2001). 
A possible change in the economic structure of the economy is introduced 
by  changing  the  energy  intensity  of  production  and  the  openness  of  the 
economy  in  the  steady  state.  With  regard  to  the  behavior  of  economic 
agents we concentrate on monetary policy. By including a Taylor rule we 
can  distinguish  between  two  possible  shifts.  The  first  is  a  change  in  the 
weights of inflation and of the output gap in the Taylor rule. The other is 
that the monetary authority changed the price index for measuring inflation. 
However, we do not find conclusive references for a different behavior of 
the  relevant  monetary  authorities  in  the  two  sub-periods  so  the  model’s 
Taylor-rule  remains  unchanged.  To  account  for  an  altered  behavior  and 
interaction of the exogenous shocks, oil prices and global economic activity 
are related within a VAR. We examine the plausibility of our analysis by 
comparing the properties of the structural model with the impulse responses 
of an unrestricted VAR and second moments of the data. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: in the next section we describe impor-
tant economic ratios and some stylized facts of the exogenous variables. In 
section three we discuss the results of the VAR approach. Section four ex-
plains the structure of the model. Subsequently, the calibration and the solu-
tion methodology are presented. In section six the simulation  results are 
shown and compared to some stylized facts. Section seven summarizes the 
major findings and draws some conclusions. 
2. Why have the effects of oil price shocks changed? 
As mentioned in the introduction there is evidence that the effects of oil 
price movements have weakened during the eighties (Jones et al 2004: 17-
20). Several explanations for the weakened relation between oil prices and 
GDP growth in oil importing countries can be discussed. 
At first, oil price hikes can obviously be interpreted as a standard supply 
shock.  In  line  with  most  observable  stylized  facts,  rising  oil  prices  then 
dampen real economic activity, raise the price level and therefore lead to 
higher interest rates (Brown et al. 2002). Thus, substantial oil price shocks 
can cause recessions in oil importing countries. This view is in particular 6  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
related to the experience of the seventies and early eighties when oil price 
shocks coincided with recessions in mayor industrialized economies and this 
coherence is confirmed by several empirical studies (e.g. Burbidge, Harrison 
1984; Cuñado, Pérez de Gracia 2003; Darby 1982; Gisser, Goodwin 1986; 
Hamilton  1983,  2003).  The  energy  intensity  of  production,  however,  was 
reduced substantially after the oil price shocks of the seventies and early 
eighties, a fact that is also observable in Germany (Frondel, Schmidt 2002; 
Schmidt, Zimmermann 2005).
1 Nowadays, firms are much less vulnerable to 
oil price increases and, in consequence, the effects of oil price hikes should 
be smaller. However, the energy cost share has partly recovered in the very 
recent past, a trend that can not be precluded to proceed in the future (Fig-
ure 5). 
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Another explanation why oil price shocks may have different effects on real 
economic activity and inflation is that the source of the shock matters (Kil-
ian 2006). With regard to the recent oil price shock it is argued that higher 
oil prices are not caused by political events in the Middle East but by higher 
demand  for  crude  oil  from  emerging  economies  like  China  and  India 
(Brown et al. 2002:15). In this case higher oil prices are associated with a 
higher demand for goods. More precisely, the negative impact of increased 
oil prices is combined with positive effects of a stronger demand for German 
exports. Figure 2 shows that this argument particularly seems to be relevant 
for the second sub-period. While world economic activity and energy prices 
exhibit  a  reverse  development  concerning  the  first  sub-period,  a  positive 
correlation between the mentioned variables can be identified with regard 
to the recent past. 
                                                           
1 In this paper we use oil and energy as synonyms because prices for other imported fossil 
sources of energy production are strongly correlated with oil prices (Asche et al., 2003). More-
over, energy efficiency is compared with energy costs, because the focus of this paper lies on 
the economic but not on the physical dimensions of energy dependence. Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  7 
















In this context it is also important that the German economy has become 
more open since the seventies (Figure 7).
2 It is therefore likely that the Ger-
man  economy  today  is  more  affected  by  fluctuations  in  global  economic 
activity while the vulnerability to oil  price shocks decreased. This means 
that nowadays it is more likely that the effects of higher oil prices are at 
least offset by higher demand from abroad. 
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Another factor, that could be important for the transmission of oil price 
shocks, is monetary policy. Price shocks have real effects if monetary policy 
reacts by raising interest rates. For example Bernanke et al. (1997) find em-
pirical evidence for this channel. In this case the downward trend of the 
inflation rates since the eighties may has reduced the necessity for central 
banks to tighten monetary policy after an oil price shock. On the other hand 
Hamilton  and  Herrera  (2004)  challenged  this  view  by  reestimating  their 
                                                           
2 Openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP.  8  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
model with a higher lag order. The authors found that the effects of oil price 
shocks are much more pronounced than in the primary paper. It is also pos-
sible that the reactions of monetary policy to oil price shocks have changed. 
A more modest reaction could be enabled by the behavior of labor unions 
because in recent years they did not any longer try to keep real wages con-
stant  after  an  oil  price  shock.  Besides,  economic  trends  which  are  often 
summarized  by  globalization  cause  downward  pressure  on  wages,  import 
prices, producer prices and, as an end, consumer prices. Overall, the true 
role of monetary policy in the transmission of oil price shocks is not assessed 
adequately yet. 
2. What are the effects of an oil price shock on the German economy? 
To get a first impression of the effects of energy price hikes on the German 
economy  we  initially  estimate  an  unrestricted  VAR-model.  We  check 
whether  the  effects  of  oil  price  shocks  on  the  German  economy  have 
changed by dividing the investigation period into two distinct sub-periods 
(1975:1 to 1990:4 and 1991:1 to 2006:4). Though most of the available infor-
mation criteria suggest a relative small lag-length, further calculations reveal 
that three (four) lags are necessary to avoid significant autocorrelation of 
the residuals in the first (second) sub-period. The VARs include the real 
energy price in euro, a measure of global economic activity, real GDP, real 
private consumption, inflation and a short term interest rates (in the order 
of their entry). Worldwide GDP includes that of the most important indus-
trialized countries, except Germany. All variables are measured in logs (ex-
cept the nominal interest rate) as deviations from a linear trend. To investi-
gate the effects of oil price hikes and world demand shocks we compute 
impulse responses. We set the impulses to one unit of the residuals. This 
option ignores the units of measurement and the correlations in the VAR 
residuals so that no transformation is performed. Apart from that, this ap-
proach has two striking advantages. First, the ordering of the variables is not 
crucial.
3  Second,  the  results  are  better  comparable  with  the  impulse  re-
sponses of the NOE-model in the reminder of this paper. 
Figure 4 presents impulse responses to an energy price shock. Solid lines 
show the estimated effects in the first sub-period. Initially, oil prices show a 
considerable amount of persistence. After a one percent increase the same 
variables deviates significantly 4 quarters from its initial value. Significance, 
in this context, means that even the responses +/- two standard deviations 
                                                           
3 Further calculations, however, reveal that a different ordering does not change the results 
dramatically even if a Cholesky decomposition of innovations is used.  Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  9 
have the same property. Then, the impulse responses show that oil price 
shocks have significant negative effects on world GDP. For Germany we 
find significant effects on private consumption. Since the effects on GDP are 
insignificant,  the  German  economy  seems  to  be  less  vulnerable  than  the 
world economy with regard to energy price hikes. As expected, consumer 
prices and the interest rate show a significant positive response. Generally, 
the reaction of domestic real variables is slightly delayed, in particular in 
comparison to oil prices and global economic activity. Approximately after 
four years the effects start to go into reverse before energy prices rebound 
to their initial value after roughly ten years. From a statistical point of view, 
significant responses, however, can only be derived for the subsequent 12 
quarters after the initial energy price hike. Overall, the results point to a 
strong negative relationship between energy price hikes and world as well as 
domestic economic activity while the link between oil prices and domestic 
nominal  variables  seems  to  be  positive.  These  findings  suggest,  that  oil 
prices, a least during the first sub-period, act as a standard supply shock, a 
result that seems to be true both concerning Germany and the global econ-
omy.  
Dashed lines represent the impulse responses to an oil price shock in the 
second  sub-period.  To  illustrate  variances  of  the  magnitude  of  the  re-
sponses, the axes are scaled in common with the first sub-period. First of all, 
it  can  be  seen  that  the  estimated  development  of  the  energy  prices  has 
changed. Instead of shaping a low-frequency wavy pattern as before, a high-
frequency, oscillatory recovering is indicated. The persistency of oil price 
shocks  –  measured  in  terms  of  significant  deviations,  however,  has  not 
changed. Then, the link between energy prices and worldwide GDP seems 
to have vanished, since the effects on worldwide GDP are insignificant in 
the second sub-period. Moreover, by taking a closer look, a positive correla-
tion between these variables may be identified. Concerning the domestic 
variables the VAR-model does not produce any significant results concern-
ing the second sub-period. Combining the results of both estimates, we con-
clude that the effects of energy price shocks on the global economy and 
even more on domestic aggregates have declined dramatically. 10  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
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To test whether oil prices and the domestic variables are related to global 
economic activity we also calculate impulse responses to a shock to the last 
mentioned variable. Figure 5 shows that the effects of worldwide demand 
shocks on energy prices and domestic variables have also changed. Even 
though most of all effects are not statistically significant some findings are 
noteworthy. Concerning the first sub-period (solid lines) a negative reaction 
of energy prices subsequent to world economic activity hikes can be meas-
ured. Then, the simulated effects on all domestic variables except the con-
sumer price level are positive. The short term interest rate shows the only 
significant response. Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  11 
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For the second sub-period (dashed lines) some findings tend to result in the 
reverse: Here, a global economic activity boom leads to an increase of real 
oil prices some periods after. Furthermore, output and consumption show 
initially a positive but subsequently a negative reaction. The opposite is true 
for the consumer price level. However, all of the mentioned responses are 
insignificant from a statistical point of view.  
To summarize, as indicated by the well-known recessions, energy price hikes 
have statistically significant negative effects on world economic activity and 
important domestic variables in the first sub-period. Concerning the second 12  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
sub-period, no statistically significant reactions to energy price hikes can be 
confirmed. Moreover, significant effects of world economic activity on en-
ergy  prices  and  most  domestic  variables  are  not  detected  in  both  sub-
periods. The last mentioned calculations, however, convey the impression 
that real oil prices and global economic activity are negatively related in the 
first- but positively related in the second sub-period. From a global perspec-
tive, therefore, the role of oil prices seems to have changed dramatically: 
while the supply shock variant is supported in first sub-period, oil prices 
seem to be rather endogenous, i.e. strongly influenced by global economic 
activity in recent times. From a German perspective, on the contrary, oil 
price  shocks  are  and  have  always  been  standard  supply  shocks,  because 
none of the VARs indicates a positive correlation between real German 
variables and real oil prices. But, in contrast to the 70s and 80s, nowadays 
the  effects  of  global  economic  activity  and  oil  price  movements  seem  to 
compensate each other. The small effects of recent oil price shocks on the 
German economy, therefore, could be caused by both a more energy effi-
cient structure of the German economy and good look, i.e. a compensation 
of negative supply effects by booming global economy. Concerning mone-
tary  policy  the  VAR-models  claim  that  central  banks  react  to  oil  price 
shocks and world GDP shocks in the first but to none of the impulses in the 
second sub-period. These findings, however, can not be taken as a proof for 
an altered reaction function of the monetary authority, but rather affirm 
smaller price level effects of exogenous shocks in the later period.
4 
The results of the VAR-analysis particularly raise two questions: First, to 
what extent have the supply effects of oil price hikes become weaker and, 
second, to what extent are they considerably compensated by a booming 
global economy. In the following we address these questions in more detail 
and try to quantify the particular effects.  
4. The NOE model 
To get a better understanding of what has reduced the effects of energy 
price  hikes  we  utilize  a  standard  open-economy  model  with  optimizing 
agents  and  sticky  prices  (McCallum,  Nelson  1998,  1999,  2001;  Kamps, 
Pierdzioch 2002). Because the derivation of the NOE-model is well docu-
mented in the literature, we present only a short summary. Moreover, only 
linearized  first  order  conditions  and  a  few  underlying  functions  are  pre-
sented. Note that lower case letters denote logs of the original variables.  
                                                           
4 Besides, we do not find conclusive evidence for a shift of the relevant Taylor rule in the lit-
erature. A short overview is given in the calibration section.  Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  13 
The equation for private consumption is derived from households maximiz-
ing their expected lifetime utility with respect to total consumption,  t cx , real 
money balances,  t m , domestic and foreign bonds. In this model utility is not 
time  separable  over  consumption.  Instead,  preferences  ( ) 1 , , t t t t u cx cx m - =  
include habit formation, using a special case of the functional form which is 
proposed by Carrol et al. (1995). By combining the first order conditions 
with regard to consumption and bonds the expectational difference equation 
for the change in consumption is: 
1 2 2 1 3 1 1 3
cx
t t t t t t g E cx g E cx g E p g E cx g R b + + + D + D + D = D +                                     (1) 
Here 
2 2
1 2 , 1 g h h g h h h s b sb sb = - = + - -   and  ( ) 3 1 g h s b = - .  Total  con-
sumption is the sum of domestic consumption,  t c , and foreign consumption, 
t imc , which leads to the following linear approximated identity for the con-
sumer price level,  t pcx : 
( ) 1
C cx c im
t t t p p p a a = + -                                                                              (2) 
where  1 a -  stands for the average share of imported goods in total con-
sumption. The remaining first order conditions of the representative house-
holds are represented by the following uncovered interest parity: 
*
1 t t t t t R R E s k + = + D + .                                                                            (3) 
Here  t R  and 
*
t R  represent the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates 
which are defined as  1 t t t R r E p + = + D  and 
* * *
1 t t t R r E p + = + D , respectively. The 
variable  t s  stands for the nominal exchange rate. In this model the foreign 
variables are treated as exogenous. To close the model we follow Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2003) by modelling the risk premium,  t k , as a function of 
the ratio of the nominal value of foreign bonds and domestic nominal out-
put. In linear term this yields: 
( )
* Y
t t t t t s b p y k j = + - - .                                                                          (4) 
To complete the model we specify a Taylor rule that determines the domes-
tic nominal interest rate.  
( ) ( ) ￿
0 3 1 2 3 1 1
i i
t t t t t R p p y R m m m p m m -   = + - D + D - + +                                       (5) 14  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
p   represents  the  inflation  objective  of  the  central  bank.  The  expression 
i
t p D   indicates  that  the  monetary  authority  has  the  opportunity  to  target 
different price indices. Hence, the effects of energy price shocks do not only 
depend on the structure of the model economy but also on the behaviour of 
the central bank. For instance, energy price shocks can have diverging ef-
fects on a consumer price index and on the GDP deflator. The output gap 
￿
t t t y y y = -                                                                                                  (6) 
is characterized as the difference between actual output,  t y , and its poten-
tial,  t y , which, in turn, is defined as the amount of production that would 
prevail  under  flexible  prices.  Because  of  its  monopoly  power  each  firm 
treats the price of his good as a choice variable while the aggregate and for-
eign price level are taken as given. After setting the profit maximizing price 
each firm produces whatever quantity of his output is demanded. It is as-
sumed that firms behave according to a price adjustment mechanism similar 
to the one introduced in Fuhrer and Moore (1995). This approach rational-
izes a reasonable degree of inertia in inflation dynamics. More precisely, it 
claims that inflation, measured as the change of the price index of domesti-
cally produced goods, is a function of the output gap and of the weighted 
average of lagged and expected inflation 
( ) ( ) 1 1 0.5
c c c
t t t t t p p p y y - + D = D +D +Y - .                                                           (7) 
Domestic output is produced by a CES-production function 





t t t t Y A N IM
u u u a a   = + -    
.                                                          (8) 
In the original paper McCallum and Nelson interpret the variable 
Y
t IM  as 
the  quantity  of  inputs,  which  are  imported  from  abroad.  However,  it  is 
straight forward to use this variable as a measure for imported oil only. Re-
calling that under price flexibility, labour input equals one for all  t , energy 











   
and output under price flexibility Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  15 
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
Y SS SS
t Y t Y t y im a im im
u u
a a   = - - + -    
   
can be derived. The parameter 
SS
Y im  represents the energy intensity of pro-
duction  in  the  steady  state.  By  combining  both  relations  imports  under 
flexible prices can be eliminated. 
( )( )























  - - -    
                                                     (9) 
Output under flexible prices positively depends on the state of production 
technology and negatively on real energy prices measured in domestic cur-
rency. Since we abstract from all imports besides energy and the real energy 
price is directly measured in Euro, the real exchange rate does not appear 
explicitly in equation (9). 
Furthermore it is assumed that the total demand for exports is given by  
*
1 2 t t t ex bq b y = +                                                                             (10) 
where the real exchange rate,  t q , is given by 
* cx cx
t t t t q s p p = + - .                                                                        (11) 
The following relation is specified to capture effects of the relative domestic 
price level on relative domestic consumption 
( ) 3
c cx
t t t t c cx b p p - = - - .                                                                       (12) 
Since we disregard capital accumulation total domestic production is spent 
solely for domestic consumption and exports 
( ) 1
SS SS
t t t y ex c ex ex = - + .                                                                         (13) 
The model is completed by the definition of the various price indices. The 
price index of domestically produced goods, 
c
t p , which is simultaneously the 
gross output deflator, 
Y
t p , and the consumer price index, 
cx
t p , are already 
specified according to equation (2) and (7). The price index of imported 16  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
consumption goods, as a first order linear approximation, can be expressed 
as follows: 
C E im im
t t p p g =                                                                       (14) 
where  g  denotes the share of imported energy in imported consumption. 
The change of prices for imported inputs for production can be expressed as 
Y E im im
t t p p = .                                                                       (15) 
Here it again becomes obvious that imports, which are used in the produc-
tion process, exclusively consist of energy. The domestic GDP deflator can 
be specified by reshaping the overall consumer price index to account for 
the effects of net exports. 
( )
1 GDP SS cx SS c im
t t t t SS p c p ex p p
c
a   = + -                                                           (16) 
Changes in import prices, 
im
t p , can be derived according to the following 
specification 
( )
1 C Y Y
SS
im im im im
t t t t SS
c





= - +                                                             (17) 
Equations (1) – (7) and (9) – (17) establish a system of 16 difference equa-
tions in the endogenous variables  t ex ,  t c ,  t cx ,  t k , 
c
t p , 
cx
t p , 
GDP
t p , 
im
t p , 
c im
t p , 
Y im
t p ,  t q ,  t R ,  t s ,  t y ,  ￿
t y ,  t y .  In  addition  we  incorporate  the  exogenous 
shocks oil prices and world GDP. To take into account that oil price move-
ments are caused by global economic activity to a certain extent we intro-
duce this link explicitly into the model. As mentioned earlier we model the 
processes for the exogenous variables as a VAR(1) (Ireland 2004).  
5. Calibration and Solution 
We calibrate most of the models’ parameters on the basis of average data 
ratios and own estimations. If these options are not possible we additionally 
utilize information from other studies.  
A crucial parameter for the magnitude of adverse supply effects of energy 
price hikes on domestic output is the energy cost share in domestic produc-Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  17 
tion. To calculate this figure we assume that 70 percent of the imported 
energy is spent for production while 30 percent are consumed by private 
households. This distribution is a very rough estimate based on information 
from the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen.  
The ratio of energy costs and domestic production characterizes an impor-
tant  dimension  of  the  models’  steady  state.  According  to  the  production 
function  different  combinations  of  1 a   and  1 u   can  assure  an  appropriate 
calibration. We choose a very simple approach by setting the parameter  1 u  
close  to  zero.  In  this  case  the  production  function  can  be  interpreted  as 
Cobb Douglas and  1 a  stands for the non-energy cost share in domestic pro-
duction. Hence, the supply side of our economy resembles the approach that 
has  been  taken  in  Kim  and  Loungani  (1991)  as  well  as  Schmidt  and 
Zimmermann (2005). However, due to the omission of capital, important 
substitution effects between energy and capital as well as between consump-
tion and savings are neglected in the model.  
The  parameter  g   marks  the  share  of  imported  energy  in  total  imported 
consumption. To assign  g  a reasonable value, information on the distribu-
tion  of  total  imports  between  the  production  and  the  household  sector 
would be needed. Because we disregard consumption imports other than 
energy,  g  must be equal to one and the fraction of domestically produced 
consumption, a , is not much lower. Even though this calibrated feature of 
the model does not describe reality properly, some strong arguments can be 
made in favour of it. By eliminating consumption imports except energy, we 
rule out the possibility that households can substantially substitute domesti-
cally produced consumption for imports in the case of energy price hikes. 
Even though this possibility presumably exists in reality, the elasticity be-
tween  relative  demand  for  foreign  consumption  and  the  relative  foreign 
price level is difficult to determine. Besides, and perhaps even more impor-
tant, to utilize this relation, the (positive) effects of energy price movements 
on the foreign price level must be specified in advance. Since for simplicity 
our model treats the foreign price level as exogenous and constant, our ap-
proach seems to be appropriate.  
A reasonable value for the share of exports in GDP, 
SS ex , can be gathered 
directly from the data. As a consequence of an increasing openness of the 
German economy, this ratio is larger in the second sub-period.
5 
                                                           
5 Note that the corresponding parameter 
SS c  is not calculated on the basis of the data. Since 
the model abstracts from saving and Capital accumulation all output beside exports is spent for 
consumption purposes. 
SS c  is therefore simply 1
SS ex - . 18  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
Concerning  preferences  we  differ  from  the  benchmark  calibration  in 
McCallum and Nelson (1999). There preferences are characterized by a low 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  s , and strong habit formation,  h . 
These features lead to distinctive consumption smoothing, which becomes 
apparent  by  low  relative  standard  deviations  and  only  very  limited  re-
sponses of this variable to exogenous shocks. Both characteristics can not be 
found in our data set and are not supported by the estimated VARs. Con-
cerning  habit  persistence  ambiguous  empirical  evidence  for  Germany  is 
available: Strong habit persistence is established by Willman (2003). In his 
investigation he estimates values up to 0.924 for Germany depending on the 
assumptions of the estimated model and the estimation strategy. However, 
Fuchs-Schündeln (2005) argues that the empirical evidence for habit forma-
tion in Germany remains inconclusive and at best very weak. Dibartolomeo 
et al. (2004) find support for this argument. They estimate a standard new 
Keynesian  model  for  the  G7  countries.  The  German  model  exhibits  the 
lowest habit persistence of all countries ( 0.610 h = ). As a compromise the 
habit formation parameter, h , is calibrated to 0.5 in our paper, which is thus 
slightly below the lowest direct empirical evidence for Germany. However, 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  s , is maybe even more impor-
tant for consumption fluctuations. For simplicity reasons and to achieve a 
better comparability we set this parameter to one, a value that is also used in 
our earlier paper (Schmidt, Zimmermann 2005) and many other well estab-
lished studies. We assign  b  the conventional value of 0.99. 
Like McCallum and Nelson (1999) we assume that the exchange rate elastic-
ity of the export demand function,  1 b , is equal to 0.33. Different from them, 
we assign the same value to the income elasticity of the export demand, too, 
because the relative volatility of exports decreases to a level that is roughly 
comparable with our data set. Finally we set the output gap coefficient of 
the  price  setting  equation  to  0.02  as  proposed  by  Kamps  andPierdzioch 
(2002) and the coefficient of the risk premium equation to -0.02 (Ambler et 
al., 2004).  
The relative foreign price level elasticity of domestically produced consump-
tion,  3 b , describes the willingness and possibilities of households to substi-
tute domestically produced goods by imports. Because we only want to al-
low for slight differences between the two consumption variables we choose 
a very low value for this parameter.  
To  calibrate  the  coefficients  of  the  Taylor  rule,  we  combine  information 
from  other  studies  and  own  estimates.  Well  established  estimates  of  the 
coefficients  of  a  Taylor  rule  for  Germany  can  be  found  in  the  paper  of 
Clarida et al. (1997). Since they exclusively utilize West German data for the Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  19 
period 1979:4 – 1994:12, the results seem to be very useful for calibrating our 
model for the first sub-period. The point estimates for the parameters  1 m  
and  2 m are 0.31 and 0.25, respectively. Work of Peersman and Smets (1998) 
and Faust et al. (2001) find similar values for these coefficients, albeit for 
slightly diverging periods. All of the mentioned papers suggest a distinctive 
tendency  to  smooth  interest  rates  over  time.  For  instance,  according  to 
Clarida et al. (1997), the point estimate of the relevant coefficient is equal to 
0.91.  However,  Clausen  and  Hayo  (2002)  come  to  quite  different  results 
( 1 2.89 m =  and  2 0.49 m = ). But, in contrast to the papers mentioned so far, 
they use quarterly data, a multi-equation framework and a slightly differing 
sample period.  
For the second sub-period coefficient estimates for a Taylor rule seem to be 
far from clear. Most results (for instance Gerdesmeier, Roffia 2003; Ulrich 
2003; Sauer, Sturm 2003) suggest that the ECB reacts to a rise in expected 
inflation by raising nominal short-term interest rates by a relatively small 
amount and thereby letting real interest rates decline. If this is the case, 
monetary  policy  in  the  Euro  area  would  be  destabilising  with  respect  to 
inflation.  On  the  other  hand  the  ECB  seems  to  respond  much  more  to 
changes in the business cycle than the Bundesbank  (Sauer, Sturm 2003). 
However, these results may be due to the lack of a forward-looking perspec-
tive in their estimated Taylor rule (Sauer, Sturm 2003). Clausen and Hayo 
(2002) differ also with respect to the second sub-period, because they again 
suggest  larger  coefficients.  A  recent  paper  by  Gerdesmeier  et  al.  (2007) 
affirms that the reaction function of the ECB still fulfils the Taylor principle. 
They estimate a Taylor rule for the Euro area close to the period of our 
second sub-sample (1993:1 – 2004:12). The results are the following:  1 m = 
0.50 and  2 m = 0.83. Again, a high degree of interest rate smoothing is con-
firmed ( 3 m = 0.90).   
To summarize, a review of the related literature does not give clear sugges-
tions. The point estimates of reaction functions of monetary policy that are 
relevant for Germany are far from conclusive. For the first sub-period, the 
results of Clarida et al. (1997) seem to be verified, in a sense, but not com-
pletely fitting for our purposes because they utilize monthly data. Albeit 
Clausen and Hayo (2002) fulfil these criteria they establish a multi equation 
framework. So far it does not seem to be clear how this framework interacts 
with our NOE model. For the second sub-period the picture is even more 
puzzling. While most studies deny a stabilizing role of the ECB with respect 
to the inflation objective, a recent investigation comes to the conclusion that 
the monetary authority strongly satisfies the Taylor principle. 20  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
To come to a compromise, we utilize the point estimates from Clarida et al. 
(1997) for the calibration of  1 m  and  2 m  for both sub-periods. The calibra-
tion of the interest rate smoothing coefficient is not controversial. Its esti-
mated value is roughly 0.9 in all studies. Table A.1 which can be found in 
the appendix summarizes the parameter values that are used for our simula-
tions. 
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which contains changes in real energy prices, a measure of global output and 
one lag of each variable ( ( ) 0,
E




t Y N e s ￿ ). Both time series 
are detrended by a linear trend. In a first step we estimate a VAR(1) includ-
ing the two exogenous variables for the complete investigation period.  
One aim of this paper is, however, to analyse whether changing effects of 
energy price hikes on the German economy are a result of altered exoge-
nous shocks or rather an effect of a changed energy cost or export share, 
which means a different economic structure. As Figure 2 indicates, the rela-
tionship between the exogenous variables may have changed. In the first 
sub-period both variables seem to be strongly negatively correlated. Con-
trary, especially in the recent past a positive correlation shows up. To get an 
idea of these considerations we repeat the detrending procedure and the 
estimation of the VAR separately for the two sub-periods.  
Table 1 summarizes the estimation results concerning the exogenous vari-
ables.  In  particular  in  the  first  sub-period  the  estimated  autocorrelation 
coefficient of the oil price has an absolute value greater than one. Further 
calculations reveal that both shocks together still build a stationary system, 
which exhibits slowly vanishing oscillatory fluctuations. In the second sub-
period the relationship between the exogenous variables has loosened dra-
matically concerning one direction and both variables have become more 
independent AR(1)-processes. However, as already indicated by the wider 
VAR-approach, that is estimated before, the magnitude of the coefficient, 
which reflects the effects of world economy booms on energy prices, has 
reduced only little. 
The models are solved according to the procedure which has been proposed 
by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). To conduct stochastic simulations and we Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  21 
use DYNARE – a pre-processor and a collection of Matlab routines (Juil-
lard 2003).  
Table 1: Estimation results concerning exogenous shocks (standard deviations 
in parenthesis) 
Parameter  1975:1 - 2006:4  1975:1 - 1990:4  1991:1 - 2006:4 





























2  0.000431  0.000442  0.000373 
E s * Y s   -0.000331  -0.000628  -0.000087 
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6. Simulation Results 
In this section we present simulation results of oil price and world GDP 
shocks in the model economy and compare them with second moments of 
the data and impulse responses of corresponding VAR models.
6 At first, we 
present simulation results under the assumption that the exogenous shock 
processes do not distinguish between the sub-periods. Then, we incorporate 
the estimated change in the behaviour of exogenous variables: that means 
that we present results of at least two simulations for each sub-period. To 
get an idea of the pure supply side effects of energy price hikes, we further-
more  run  simulations  where  the  indirect  effects  of  energy  price  changes 
which are caused by changes of world wide GDP, are eliminated from the 
model. To consider sample uncertainty, all second moments of our models 
are averages across 1,000 simulation data sets, each with 64 observations.  
Table 2 presents second moments for the first sub-period which lasts from 
1975:1 to 1990:4. The simulated moments are calculated under the assump-
tion that only the economic structure but not the exogenous shock processes 
distinguish between the sub-periods. For each variable we show the absolute 
volatility, the relative volatility in respect to output and the contemporane-
ous  correlation  with  output.  As  indicated  by  table  2  output  in  Germany 
fluctuates by roughly 1.1 percent in both sub-periods. Private consumption 
is roughly as volatile as GDP, a feature that is also found by other studies 
(for  instance  Fiorito,  Kollintzas  1994;  Schmidt,  Zimmermann  2005; 
Zimmermann 2005). Exports exhibit a much larger volatility than output, a 
feature that manifests by a relative standard deviation of more than three. 
The relative volatility of consumption and exports is slightly lower in the 
second sub-period while the opposite is true concerning contemporaneous 
correlations with GDP.  
                                                           
6 Note that the VARs, which are estimated in section 3 can not serve for a rough compari-
son. Since the lag-length of these VARs is bigger, the exogenous variables show certainly richer 
dynamics than in the NOE-model. Instead, VAR-models where only one lag is included are 
compared because the NOE-model seems to be acceptable if certain shocks are similarly trans-
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Table 2: Second moments assuming constant exogenous shock processes (HP-filtered  
series (λ = 1600), standard errors in parenthesis) 
1975:1 – 1990:4   1991:1 – 2006:4  Variable 
(x)  Output  Consumption  Exports  Output  Consumption   Exports 
σx  1.14  1.12  3.94  1.12  0.99  3.54 
σx/σY  -  0.98  3.46  -  0.88  3.16  (1) 
ρx  -  0.67  0.57  -  0.71  0.79 






































σx/σY  -  1.37 
(0.00) 
-  -  1.52 
(0.00) 
-  (3) 
ρx  -  1.00 
(0.00) 




(2) NOE model incorporating energy price and world economic activity shocks 
(3) NOE model incorporating energy price shocks and constant exports 
Concerning simulated moments, it becomes obvious that according to our 
model energy price and world economic activity shocks can explain, as an 
approximation, 75% of the fluctuations of the German output in the first 
sub-period.
7 Moreover, all relative standard deviations and correlation with 
output are close to the corresponding data values, which underlines that our 
model is acceptable for the explanation of business cycles in Germany. By 
comparing the moments that are calculated for the second sub-period, it 
shows up that the reduced energy intensity of German production has de-
creased the vulnerability concerning energy price hikes. More precisely, the 
explainable output fluctuations reduce to slightly less than one half of the 
fluctuations that can be observed in reality. That means that the reduced 
energy intensity overstates the effects of a bigger export share. The overall 
ability of the model to account for certain features of the German business 
cycle is slightly reduced, a feature which  should be rather interpreted as an 
effect of missing important shocks than as an argument against the general 
                                                           
7 This figure is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of a model’s variable by the 
standard deviation of the actual variable in Germany (Kydland, Prescott 1991). 24  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
theoretical approach. To sum up, the altered calibration of the model leads 
to an obvious reduction of the effects of energy price and world economic 
activity shocks. Relative standard deviations and correlations are remarka-
bly well for the first sub-period, approving that our model constitutes a use-
ful approach to explain German business cycles. However, it has to be noted 
that the division of the investigation periods into two sub-samples seriously 
aggravates sample uncertainty.  
The last three rows of table 2 show the results of a pure supply side ap-
proach. Here exports are assumed to be constant so that indirect effects of 
energy price shocks are eliminated. It should be noted that energy price 
movements can account for more than 60 percent in the first but not even 40 
percent of the aggregate fluctuations in Germany in the second sub-period. 
Both values seem to be rather large in comparison to results available in the 
literature (Schmidt, Zimmermann 2005; Zimmermann 2007). These varie-
ties may be explained by the following differences. At first, and maybe most 
important, our investigation utilizes quarterly data which implies more in-
novations and a higher persistency of supply shocks. Then, our production 
function abstracts from capital whereas the production function originally 
proposed by Kim and Loungani (1992) allows for substantial substitution of 
energy by capital in the face of energy price hikes. Since the exclusion of 
world economy effects lowers the standard deviation of output to a bigger 
extent in the second sub-period, the higher export ratio that is assumed in 
the recent past shows up also in table 3.  
The effects of a reduced energy cost share and a higher export share can 
also be illustrated by impulse response functions (Figure 6). In the following 
solid (dashed) lines represent reaction functions to a one percent increase of 
the exogenous variables for the first (second) sub-period. Note that the re-
action of the real variables output and consumption to an oil price hike is 
reduced by roughly one half. The increase in the consumer price level is also 
reduced and not as persistent as in the first sub-sample. Then, automatically, 
the monetary authority shows a weaker reaction.  
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions of the NOE-model to an oil price shock assuming un-
changed exogenous shock processes 




































Figure 7 visualizes the effects of a reduced energy cost share and a higher 
export share on the reaction of the endogenous variables in consequence of 
an increase of worldwide economic activity. The higher export share causes 
a stronger initial positive (weaker initial negative) reaction of output (con-
sumption). Because of the reduced energy cost share, the succeeding damp-
ening effects of the higher oil prices are weaker than in the first-sub-period.  
To summarize the altered calibration leads to weaker supply side effects of 
energy price hikes. Moreover, the initial positive effects of an increase in 
worldwide  economic  activity  become  stronger,  whereas  the  succeeding 
negative effects caused by the related energy price hike are reduced. 26  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions of the NOE-model after a world GDP shock assuming 
unchanged exogenous shock processes 
































Table 3 presents the same moments that are reported above, but know al-
tered shock processes are incorporated. At a first glance it becomes obvious, 
that the differences between the sub-periods become distinctive and statisti-
cally significant if sample uncertainty is considered. Energy price and world 
economic activity explain slightly more than 100 percent of the output fluc-
tuations in Germany in the first but only one fourth of the aggregate fluctua-
tions  in  the  second  sub-sample.  Other  results  are  also  pronounced.  The 
NOE-model for the first sub-period performs very well concerning German 
business cycle characteristics. Then, the opposite is true for the more recent 
past. None of the moments shows up as acceptable. Again our interpretation 
is that important drivers of business cycle fluctuations in Germany during 
recent times are missing. The last three lines claim that energy price move-
ments  alone  can  account  for  all  of  the  output  fluctuations  in  Germany, 
whereas the same variable can only be made responsibly for 15 % in the 
second sub-period. Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  27 
Table 3: Second moments allowing for changed exogenous shock processes (HP- 
filtered series (λ = 1600), standard errors in parenthesis) 
1975 - 1990   1991 - 2006  Variable 
(x) 
Output  Consumption  Exports   Output  Consumption  Exports  
σx  1.14  1.12  3.94  1.12  0.99  3.54 
σx/σY  -  0.98  3.46  -  0.88  3.16  (1) 
ρx  -  0.67  0.57  -  0.71  0.79 
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(2) NOE model incorporating energy price and world economic activity shocks 
(3) NOE model incorporating energy price shocks and constant exports 
As indicated by the second moments the different calibration in combina-
tion with the altered shock processes leads to very different properties of 
the  endogenous  variables  which  manifests  also  in  very  different  impulse 
response functions. If the theoretical model is a reasonable interpretation of 
the transmission mechanisms that are relevant in reality, impulse response 
functions of a VAR(1) - richer dynamics of the exogenous variables are not 
implemented in the model - should roughly equal the estimated reactions 
presented above. To check for these properties, the  confidence bands  of 
estimated VAR(1)-models can act as a rough benchmark. For clarity they 
are not drawn in the following.
8  
                                                           
8  Impulse  responses  of  this  specification  can  be  found  in  the  appendix.  Exact  numbers 
should not be taken too seriously, because the estimates may be biased as a result of autocorre-
lated residuals. 28  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
A comparison reveals that reactions of the model’s endogenous variables to 
oil price hikes (figure 8) lie inside the confidence bands of a VAR(1)-model 
in  the  first  sub-period.  Moreover,  the  shape  of  the  reactions  can  be  ex-
plained remarkable well concerning output, the price level and the interest 
rate. However, the reaction of private consumption differs from the esti-
mated  response,  because  in  the  model  consumption  reacts  immediately, 
while the VAR-model shows a more delayed response. Also the recovery of 
consumption proceeds earlier in the NOE-model.  
Dashed lines represent the impulse response functions to an oil price shock 
for the second sub-sample. Some findings are worth to mention: At first, the 
altered  exogenous  processes  cause  a  less  persistent  reaction  of  domestic 
variables since energy price themselves are less persistent and the interac-
tion with world economic activity has weakened. Besides, the initial reaction 
becomes  weaker  in  consequence  of  an  altered  less  energy  intensive  eco-
nomic structure.  
According to all estimated VARs of the second sub-period none of the do-
mestic variables react in a statistically significant dimension. The sole excep-
tion is the estimated response of the nominal interest rate. For this reason a 
comparison of the models IRF with the responses of the estimated VAR(1) 
is not really a useful task. For completeness, it should be mentioned that the 
magnitude of the reaction of the nominal interest rate can explained by our 
model whereas the shape of the response can not. 
Because the NOE-model has shown up as a satisfying approach to explain 
the main characteristics of business cycle fluctuations in Germany and the 
transmission of oil price shocks, it seems to be worthy to name some num-
bers. Concerning the first sub-period the simulated energy price hike leads 
to a maximum output (consumption) reduction of roughly 0.03 (0.02) per-
cent. The same shock causes an increase in the price level of roughly 0.3 
percent, which forces the central bank to raise nominal interest rates by 25 
basis points. In the second sub-period the magnitude of the reaction of the 
domestic variables is less than one half of the named values. Moreover, the 
maximum deviations take place immediately after the initial response and 
are reducing constantly without showing a wavy pattern. So as suggested by 
the previous analysis, the combination of altered economic structure and 
distinguished  exogenous  processes  leads  to  weaker  and  less  volatile  re-
sponses in consequence of oil price hikes.  Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  29 
Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions of the NOE-model to an oil price shock allowing for 
changed exogenous shock processes 







































Figure  9  shows  impulse  response  functions  to  world  GDP  shocks  of  the 
NOE-models incorporating altered parameters and distinguished shocks. A 
world economic boom leads to an initial increase in domestic output. But, 
subsequently, after energy prices have hiked this result turns into the oppo-
site. Besides, the world demand shock and the following energy price hike 
causes an increase of the price level which, in turn, forces the monetary au-
thority to raise the nominal interest rate. The last mentioned nominal vari-
ables show the maximum response 10 or 15 periods after the initial impulse. 
The response of consumption is negative in the short run. The reaction of 
consumption turns only into positive direction more than 20 periods after 
the initial impulse and, additionally, only in the first sub-period because the 
wavy response is more distinctive, then. The last mentioned point is true for 
all variables, what is an automatic consequence of the altered shock proc-
esses. More precisely, the initial response of German GDP to world demand 
shocks is bigger for the second sub-period in consequence of a higher export 
share. The opposite occurs for the subsequent counter reaction as a result of 
lower energy intensity. 30  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
Figure 9: Impulse Response Functions of the NOE-model to a world GDP shock allowing for 
changed exogenous shock processes 


































Though most responses to world demand shocks are not statistically signifi-
cant, a comparison with the VAR(1) results seems to be useful for plausibil-
ity purposes. At first both calculations lead to similar results what stresses 
the quality of our theoretical approach. However, two objections are note-
worthy.  At  first,  the  positive  response  of  real  variables  takes  place  with 
more delay according to the VAR-approach. Then, and more important, the 
VAR-model does not imply a negative reaction of consumption. This fea-
ture seems to be the only theoretical weakness of our NOE-approach. Be-
cause of the lack of statistical significance, these objections should not be 
taken too seriously.  
7. Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  try  to  answer  the  question  why  the  effects  of  oil  price 
shocks on the German economy have reduced in recent years. A first expla-
nation is that the oil intensity of production was reduced since the oil price 
shocks of the seventies and early eighties. In this case oil prices would have 
become of minor importance for business cycle analysis. Another interpre-Why are the Effects of Recent Oil Price Shocks so Small?  31 
tation is that the recent oil price hike was caused by increasing demand re-
lated to strong global economic activity. In this case the dampening effects 
of raising oil prices were offset by raising world demand. This means that a 
pure oil supply shock would still have pronounced effects on economic ac-
tivity.  
To analyse the effects of oil price hikes we initially estimate unrestricted 
VARs for two sub-samples. While significant negative reactions of global 
economic activity and consumption plus positive responses of the price level 
and the nominal interest rate can be measured for the first sub-period, none 
of these results is valid in the recent past. We also compare a pure oil price 
shock to a shock of world demand in both sub-samples. In the first period a 
world demand shock only affects the nominal interest rate. In the second 
sub-sample the demand shock has  no  significant effects. The impulse re-
sponse functions, however, suggest that since the early nineties changes in 
oil prices are at least to some extent positively related to world demand 
while the opposite is true for the 70s and 80s. In combination these results 
indicate, that the role of oil price shocks may have changed from a global 
point of view but are still standard supply shocks from a German perspec-
tive.  
To get a better understanding of the quantitative effects of these develop-
ments  we  utilize  a  NOE-model  with  optimizing  agents  and  sticky  prices. 
According to the model global economic activity affects exports and in turn 
domestic production while the energy cost share is a crucial parameter for 
the supply side effects of oil price hikes. That way, this approach gives us the 
opportunity  to  account  separately  for  the  effects  of  an  altered  economic 
structure and of distinctive exogenous shocks. To estimate the magnitude of 
the effects of oil price shocks and to check for the appropriateness of our 
approach we calculate some second moments and impulse responses of the 
structural  model.  Note,  that  especially  in  the  first  sub-period  the  model 
shows relative standard deviations and correlations that are very close to the 
data moments. Very most of them are statistically equal to the data pen-
dants if sample uncertainty is considered. Moreover, we check if the impulse 
response functions of the NOE-models lie inside the confidence bands of a 
corresponding VAR(1). The NOE-model also passes this rough plausibility 
test. 
Our simulations show that the small effects of energy price hikes on the 
German economy can only partly be traced to a lower energy intensity of 
production and increased openness. These changes, as an approximation, 
have moderated the effects of energy price shocks by only 40 percent – ac-
cording  to  standard  deviations  of  output.  The  same  results  indicate  that 
energy price shocks (and succeeding movements in worldwide production) 32  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
can not explain all fluctuations  (75 percent)  in the energy intensive sub-
period but anyway over 40 percent in the recent past. The magnitude of the 
responses after initial energy price impulses reduces by approximately one 
half.  
However, these findings do not allow for changes of the persistence and 
interaction of the model’s exogenous variables. To consider this we do the 
same exercises but incorporate separately estimated shock-VARs. By that 
we find a dramatic reduction in the importance of energy price shocks, be-
cause effects of a less energy intensive production are amplified by less per-
sistent energy price movements and a remarkably altered interaction with 
worldwide  economic  activity.  While  energy  price  shocks  (and  succeeding 
movements in worldwide production) can account for more than all fluctua-
tions in output in the earlier sub-sample, the importance of energy price 
movements is reduced to approximately one fourth in the recent sub-period. 
The differences concerning the other endogenous variables are similar. The 
maximum response of domestic output after an energy price shock is re-
duced by more than one half and, additionally, the deviations show much 
less persistency and no oscillating pattern. 
To summarize, on the one hand the negligible effects of recent oil price 
hikes on the German economy are related to a reduced oil intensity of pro-
duction. This explanation means that also future oil price hikes will not have 
the same dampening effects of the seventies. On the other hand, because a 
substantial  part  of  the  moderation  is  caused  by  good  luck  in  terms  of  a 
strong growing global economy, oil prices are still important for business 
cycles in Germany. Though only German data has been used so far, the 
qualitative aspects of our results should also be valid for other oil importing 
countries. 
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Appendix A: Calibration of model versions 
Table A.1:Parameter values 
Parameter  1975:1 – 1990:4  1991:1 – 2006:4 
Production     
1-
1 a   0.022633  0.013446 
SS
Y im  
0.022633  0.013446 
1 u   -0.001  -0.001 
Preferences     
s   1  1 
b   0.99  0.99 
h   0.6  0.6 
Shares     
SS ex   0.229153  0.308110 
a   0.983719  0.990155 
g   1  1 
Aggregate supply 
Y   0.02  0.02 
Elasticities     
1 b   0.33  0.33 
2 b   0.33  0.33 
3 b   0.1  0.1 
j   -0.02  -0.02 
Taylor rule     
i
t p D  
cx
t p D  
cx
t p D  
p   0  0 
0 m   0  0 
1 m   0.3  0.3 
2 m   0.25  0.25 
3 m   0.9  0.9 36  Torsten Schmidt and Tobias Zimmermann 
 
Appendix B: Impulse responses of a VAR(1)-model 
Figure B.1: Impulse response functions of the VAR(1)-model to an oil price shock (1975:1-
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Figure B.2: Impulse response functions of the VAR(1)-model to a world GDP shock (1975:1-
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Appendix C: Data description 
GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product. Chain index. Seasonally adjusted by official 
source. National Accounts. Federal Statistical Office Germany. 
Consumer  price  level:  GDP,  implicit  Price  Deflator.  National  Accounts.  Federal 
Statistical Office Germany. 
Consumption:  Real  private  household  consumption.  Chain  index.  Seasonally  ad-
justed by official source. National Accounts. Federal Statistical Office Ger-
many. 
Exports: Real exports. Chain index. Seasonally adjusted by official source. National 
Accounts.Federal Statistical Office Germany. 
Real Energy imports: Nominal energy imports – GDP-deflated. Foreign trade statis-
tics. Statistical Office Germany. 
Real oil price: Imported energy price index 2000 = 100 – GDP-deflated. Foreign 
trade price statistics. Federal Statistical Office Germany. 
Nominal interest rate: three month interbank rate. German Bundesbank. 
Global GDP: Real Gross Domestic Product of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
USA. OECD. 